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1 Introduction
Labor market programs often combine elements of monitoring and compul-
sion. The monitoring component makes the unemployed aware of the re-
quired search activities in order to remain eligible for unemployed beneﬁts,
the compulsion component stimulates unemployed to ﬁnd a job more quickly
because of the increased costs of being unemployed. The empirical eﬀects of
monitoring and compulsion are conﬁrmed in the small literature of experi-
mental evaluation studies performed in the U.S. and Europe. Meyer (1995)
for example in his overview of unemployment insurance experiments in the
U.S. shows that enforcing work search rules and strengthening work tests
aﬀect the speed with which people leave unemployment. Klepinger et al.
(2002) analyze a 1994 experiment in Maryland in which several treatments
are studied simultaneously. It turns out that more intensive search require-
ments, veriﬁcation of employer contacts and assignment to a job search
workshop reduced unemployment beneﬁt duration. Interestingly, the lat-
ter eﬀect occurred because workers left unemployment immediately prior to
their scheduled workshop, thus avoiding attendance. Similarly, Black et al.
(2003) studying a reemployment service experiment in Kentucky ﬁnd that
the treatment eﬀect is largely accomplished by early exits which coincide
in time with the letters sent out to notify the beneﬁt claimants of their
obligations. In Europe the ﬁndings in experimental evaluation studies are
similar. Gorter and Kalb (1996) ﬁnd that intensive counseling and monitor-
ing of Dutch unemployed reduced their unemployment duration. Dolton and
O’Neill (1996, 2002) analyzing experiments in the UK, where unemployed
were obliged to attend meetings with a counselor ﬁnd that the interviews
reduced the male unemployment rate.
In Graversen and Van Ours (2008a, 2008b) we evaluate a mandatory
activation program in Denmark which was implemented in an experimental
setting. In two Danish counties about half of the newly unemployed workers
were randomly assigned to the program while the other half got a regular
treatment. We show that assignment to the treatment group increased the
job ﬁnding rate of unemployed workers on average with 30%. The main1 Introduction 3
eﬀect of the treatment occurs in the range 10-25 weeks of unemployment.
As we discuss in more detail later on, because of the experimental set-up it
is easy to determine the overall eﬀect of the activation program. The ques-
tion why the program worked is much harder to address. In our previous
studies we concluded that the treatment eﬀect of the activation program is
mainly driven by the threat eﬀect at the start of the experiment, the in-
tensive monitoring and counseling in between programs and by the threat
of having to enter a training program later on. We concluded that the ef-
fectiveness of the activation programs is driven mostly by the compulsory
nature. Rosholm (2008) studying the same Danish labor market experiment
conﬁrms our ﬁndings. He focuses on the threat eﬀect ﬁnding that the treat-
ment eﬀect disappears once the estimated risk of participation is included
as an explanatory variable in the exit rate out of unemployment.
In the current paper we investigate the activation program in more detail
focusing on the heterogeneity of the treatment eﬀect. A possible reason
for workers to dislike activation programs is that counseling and program
participation are time consuming. There are two possible reasons for this.
First, it could be that the program activities themselves are time consuming
since workers have to attend them regularly and over long calendar time
periods. Second, it could be that the travel related to the program activities
is time consuming. We distinguish between the two possible explanations by
investigating whether the treatment eﬀect is related to the distance between
the municipality of residence and the municipality in which the activation
program takes place. Our main ﬁnding is that indeed the treatment eﬀect
increases with this distance.
The paper is set-up as follows. In the next section we present some
theoretical considerations about the way activation programs might aﬀect
the behavior of unemployed workers. In section 3 we provide details of the
Danish experiment and in section 4 we discuss some stylized ﬁndings con-
cerning the intensity of program activities and concerning the relationship
between distance and job ﬁnding rates. Section 5 presents our empirical
analysis of the determinants of the job ﬁnding rates and the quality of post-2 Activation and active labor market programs 4
unemployment jobs. Section 6 concludes.
2 Activation and active labor market programs
To illustrate how an activation program might aﬀect the behavior of individ-
ual unemployed workers we use a simpliﬁed search model. We distinguish
between an activation eﬀect related to compulsory participation and a hu-
man capital eﬀect related to the improvement of the labor market position
of the individual. The activation eﬀect is considered to be identical to a
decrease in the utility of unemployment; the human capital eﬀect is equiva-
lent to an increase of search eﬀectiveness (the probability to get a job oﬀer
conditional on a contact). So the activation eﬀect will increase the search
intensity while the human capital eﬀect will increase the acceptance proba-
bility because it makes the worker more attractive for a potential employer
or makes search more eﬃcient, i.e. less costly. The two eﬀects are observa-
tionally equivalent but may have diﬀerent implications.
Workers are assumed to be risk-neutral and cannot save; hence they con-
sume all their income each period. This assumption rules out the possibility
that agents save to insure themselves against the loss of income due to un-
employment. Once a worker becomes unemployed, he receives an unemploy-
ment beneﬁt that is constant over the unemployment spell. For simplicity
we assume that labor is homogeneous, i.e. all jobs oﬀer the same wage w net
of taxes while unemployed workers receive unemployment beneﬁts b, with
b ≤ w being the replacement rate. Unemployed workers are looking for job
oﬀers and as soon as they get one they will accept it. Thus the unemployed
have only one instrument of search, their search intensity. An unemployed
worker is assumed to search for a job with search intensity s ≥ 0. The disu-
tility of searching at intensity s equals γ(s), such that γ(s) = 1
2γs2, with
γ > 0. So the disutility of search increases with the search intensity with an
increasing marginal disutility. The search for a job generates a ﬂow of job
oﬀers, which follow a Poisson process with arrival rate µs. The arrival rate
of job oﬀers consists of two parts, one part (µ) is determined by the state
of the labor market i.e. the number of vacancies and unemployed and the2 Activation and active labor market programs 5
other part (s) is determined by the optimizing behavior of the unemployed
worker. To illustrate the activation eﬀect we assume that all unemployed
workers have to attend a job search assistance program that lasts from the
beginning of the unemployment spell until the worker ﬁnds a job. The job
search program aﬀects the unemployed worker in two ways. First, the hu-
man capital eﬀect increases the eﬀectiveness of search which reduces his
search costs with a fraction σ ∈ (0,1). Second, the activation eﬀect, i.e. the
job search program reduces the utility derived from the ﬂow of beneﬁts with
a fraction p ∈ (0,1). In other words the activation part of the job search
program has the same eﬀect as a penalty on unemployment beneﬁts. Now
the following Bellman equation can be derived for the unemployed workers,
with Vu denoting the expected discounted vale of being unemployed:
ρVu = maxs{(1 − p)b − (1 − σ)γ(s) + µs(Ve − Vu)} (1)
where Ve is the value of being employed and ρ is the discount rate. The
ﬂow value of unemployment consists of two parts: the ﬂow of utility during
unemployment (utility of beneﬁts minus search costs) and the expected ﬂow
of additional income after the job is found. The optimal search intensity
s∗ follows directly from diﬀerentiating equation (1) and is given by (1 −





So, the optimal search intensity increases with the diﬀerence between the
values of employment and unemployment - and thus with the size of p -
and with the job search subsidy σ. Furthermore, optimal search intensity is
higher when search costs are lower and when the labor market is tight. For
the employed workers the following Bellman equation holds:
ρVe = w + δ(Vu − Ve) (3)
where Ve is the expected discounted value of being employed and δ is the
job separation rate, which is assumed to be exogenous. Equation (3) says
that the ﬂow value of being employed for a worker equals the utility from2 Activation and active labor market programs 6
the wage he receives each period plus the probability δ that the match is
dissolved, in which case he becomes unemployed and receives Vu instead of
Ve.
Using equation (3) we can rewrite the optimal search intensity as
s∗ =
µ(w − ρVu)
(1 − σ)γ(ρ + δ)
(4)
Now deﬁning s∗
a as the optimal search intensity for the workers in the treated
group and s∗
c as the optimal search intensity for the workers in the control
group who are not obliged to participate in the job search program and
assuming that for both groups wages, labor market, job destruction rates
and the discount rate are identical, while σc = 0 we ﬁnd for the treatment







(1 − σt)(w − ρVu,c)
(5)
So, the search intensity of unemployed workers in activation programs is
higher for two reasons. First, through the human capital eﬀect, the costs
of job search are reduced. Second, through the activation eﬀect the value
of being unemployed is lower.1 Empirically we distinguish between the two
explanations by analyzing diﬀerences in treatment eﬀects across individuals.
In particular we consider the eﬀect of physical distance between the unem-
ployed worker and the activation program. The human capital part of the
program is uncorrelated with the travel distance but the compulsion part
does vary with the distance. If individuals live further away from the place
where activation occurs the perceived costs of participation in the program
(travel costs including travel time) are higher. Then the treatment eﬀect
should increase with the distance between worker and activation program.
1 Van Ours (2007) provides a more extended model that also accounts for job creation,
job destruction, wage bargaining and matching. In this extended model the search subsidy
and activation eﬀect also inﬂuence wage bargaining through the eﬀect on the value of being
unemployed. Note that the eﬀects on wages are opposite. Because the search subsidy
increases the value of unemployment wages are expected to be higher; and because the
activation eﬀect reduces the value of unemployment wages are expected to be lower.3 The Danish experiment 7
3 The Danish experiment
3.1 Set-up of the experiment
To assess the eﬀectiveness of an activation program two Danish counties
– Storstrøm County and South Jutland County each with approximately
250,000 inhabitants – participated in a ﬁeld experiment. In the experiment
half of the newly unemployed UI beneﬁt recipients who registered them-
selves as unemployed at the Public Employment Service (PES) during the
period from November 1, 2005 to February 28, 2006, were assigned to an
activation program. The individuals constituting the treatment group of the
experiment were all born between the 1st and the 15th of a given month.
The other half of the newly unemployed UI beneﬁt recipients received the
normal services from the PES. These individuals constituting the control
group were born on the 16th or a later day of a given month. Since selection
into treatment or control group is based on birth dates within a given month
and the timing of birth within a particular month is unrelated to job ﬁnding
rates, the experiment is truly random.
The procedure used for the treatment group was as follows. When an
individual notiﬁed the PES that he/she was unemployed, within 1.5 weeks
the individual received a letter saying that he/she was selected to participate
in the program. The letter also gave a short description of the activities
contained in the program. After 5-6 weeks of unemployment individuals had
to participate in a two-week job search program. After that the individuals
had to attend meetings once a week (in Storstrøm) or once every second week
(in South Jutland). The purpose of the meetings was to assist individuals in
their job search and to monitor their job search eﬀorts. The individuals could
also receive job oﬀers mediated by the PES. After 4 months of unemployment
individuals had to participate in an activation program with a duration of
at least 3 months. Individuals who did not ﬁnd a job after 6-7 months had
to participate in a longer meeting with a case worker and a new job plan
was made containing a description of the activities to improve the chances
of ﬁnding a job.3 The Danish experiment 8
The services oﬀered to the control group during the early stage of the
unemployment period were much less intensive than the services oﬀered to
the treatment group. Individuals in the control group typically would have
to participate in an activation program after one year of unemployment. UI
beneﬁt recipients below 30 and UI beneﬁt recipients above 60 would have
to participate in an activation program after 6 months of unemployment
though. Job search assistance and monitoring was less intensive and less
formalized for the control group than for the treatment group.
3.2 Data
The data used in our analysis come from three diﬀerent sources. The ﬁrst
data source is the administrative registers of the PES. From these registers
we have the following pieces of information for each individual: treatment
status (in treatment group or control group), age, sex, immigrant status (im-
migrant or non-immigrant), country of origin, ﬁrst week of the individuals
unemployment spell (can be one of the weeks from the last week of October
(week 43) in 2005 to the last but one week of February (week 8) in 2006, i.e.
one of the weeks in the assignment period of the experiment), county where
the individual lives, geographic location of the local PES oﬃce where the
individual has registered as unemployed, and previous occupation.2 There is
also information about all meetings (type and date) between the unemployed
individuals and caseworkers at the PES or with private contractors.
The second data source is the DREAM database developed by the Danish
National Labor Market Authority. From the DREAM database we have
detailed weekly information about individuals’ receipt of diﬀerent public
income transfers and individuals’ participation in activation programs. The
information in the database is available up to the end of 2007.
The third data source is Statistics Denmark with databases containing
information on educational attainment, accumulated work experience, mar-
ital status, number and age of children, municipality of residence, start and
2 The occupational classiﬁcation is based on the name of the UI fund that pays UI
beneﬁts to the individual.3 The Danish experiment 9
end dates of employment periods, and various job characteristics (hourly
wage rate, municipality of workplace, level of qualiﬁcations needed in job).3
We combine the event history information from the diﬀerent data sources
to determine the duration of unemployment spells, the duration of employ-
ment spells, and the relevant exit states. We apply the same selection cri-
teria as those used in Graversen and van Ours (2008b). However, since we
use an updated version of the DREAM database and since we exclude in-
dividuals with missing data on explanatory variables and individuals with
missing data on municipality of residence the sample size is slightly smaller
in this paper. Our analysis is based on data for 2105 individuals from South
Jutland County and 2368 individuals from Storstrøm County.
3.3 Distances
There are 4 local PES oﬃces in each of the counties involved in the exper-
iment. The PES oﬃces in South Jutland County are located in Haderslev,
Sønderborg, ˚ Abenr˚ a and Tønder and the PES oﬃces in Storstrøm County
are located in Næstved, Vordingborg, Nykøbing Falster and Nakskov. Fig-
ure 1a illustrates the geographical location of the PES oﬃces. Thin lines are
municipal boundaries and municipalities within South Jutland County and
Storstrøm County are marked with various grey shading.
Individuals have a choice as to which PES oﬃce they prefer to go to
when they register as unemployed. However, most individuals choose to
register with the nearest PES oﬃce. Generally, almost all individuals from
a given municipality register with the same PES oﬃce.4
3 The information on start and end dates of employment periods is generally of a lower
quality than the information on start and end dates of periods in which public income
transfers are received. The algorithm that determines the duration of unemployment
and employment periods therefore places more weight on the latter type of information.
There is no information in the data about self-employment and the information about
employment periods and job characteristics is only available up to the end of 2006. An
unemployment spell continues until the individual stopped receiving UI beneﬁts for four
consecutive weeks. An employment spell is assumed to continue as long as the individual
receives no public income transfers.
4 There are a few municipalities where the unemployed register with two diﬀerent PES3 The Danish experiment 10
Figure 1a illustrates with diﬀerent grey shading which PES oﬃce the
majority of the individuals from each municipality went to when registering
as unemployed. For example, in the municipalities in South Jutland marked
with the lightest grey shading, the largest fraction of individuals registered
as unemployed with the PES oﬃce in ˚ Abenr˚ a. In the empirical analysis, we
assume that all individuals in a given municipality register with the most
important PES oﬃce, i.e. the oﬃce that most individuals go to.5
The mandatory activities for the treatment group were not only handled
by caseworkers at the PES oﬃces. In both counties private agencies were
responsible for the two-week job search programs scheduled after 5-6 weeks
of unemployment. The intensive sequence of meetings after the job search
program was also contracted out to private agencies for all individuals in the
treatment group in South Jutland and for individuals older than 50 in the
treatment group in Storstrøm. The oﬃces of the private agencies responsible
for the job search programs are located in the same municipalities as the
PES oﬃces and the workers have to attend a job search program in the
municipality where the PES oﬃce with which they registered as unemployed
is located. However, to reduce the overall costs of the experiment, the
oﬃces because the distance to the two oﬃces is almost the same. In Tinglev for example,
82% of the unemployed registered with the PES oﬃce in ˚ Abenr˚ a and 18% registered
with the PES oﬃce in Tønder. In Maribo and Holeby the majority (almost 90%) of
the unemployed registered with the PES oﬃce in Nakskov while the rest registered with
the PES oﬃce in Nykøbing Falster. In all other municipalities more than 90% of the
unemployed registered with one speciﬁc PES oﬃce.
5 We do not use information about the actual PES oﬃce aﬃliation. This choice is
not essential for a number of reasons. First, only few individuals chose to register with
an alternative PES oﬃce, i.e. another PES oﬃce than the most usual one. Second, the
organization of the mandatory activities are very similar across PES oﬃces within a given
county (e.g., the meeting intensities and the activation program participation rates are
very similar across PES oﬃces). Therefore individuals should not choose a particular
PES oﬃce because the activities are of a higher quality or because the activities are less
time consuming. Third, the distance to the nearest PES oﬃce (which is a key ﬁgure
in our empirical analyses) is not much diﬀerent between individuals living in the same
municipality even if some individuals have a shorter distance to another PES oﬃce than
the most important one.3 The Danish experiment 11
workers who registered with the PES oﬃce in Tønder had to go to ˚ Abenr˚ a
to participate in the job search program. Figure 1b illustrates the distances
between each municipality and the job search programs using the intervals
0-4 km, 5-24 km and 25+ km.6
For most of the workers who had to attend meetings with private agencies
the oﬃces where meetings were held were located in the same municipality
as the PES oﬃce with which they registered as unemployed. However, in
South Jutland higher educated workers (i.e. workers with a long further or
higher education) who registered as unemployed in Tønder or Haderslev had
to go to ˚ Abenr˚ a to attend the meetings. Figure 1c illustrates the distances
between each municipality in South Jutland County and the oﬃces where
meetings are held separately for workers with and without a long further or
higher education.7
In Storstrøm the private agencies responsible for meetings with workers
older than 50 had oﬃces in 8 diﬀerent municipalities. There were oﬃces in
each of the municipalities where the PES oﬃces are located and in four other
municipalities (Maribo, Sakskøbing, Fakse and Præstø). The workers would
generally have to go to the nearest oﬃce to attend the meetings. Figure
1d illustrates the distances between each municipality in Storstrøm County
and the oﬃces where meetings are held separately for workers younger and
older than 50.
In the empirical analyses we generally use the distance to the job search
program as our distance measure. However, when analyzing job ﬁnding rates
in section 5.1 we let distance be a time-varying variables. Before and during
the job search program distances are set equal to the distances to the job
search programs. After the job search program distances are set equal to
distances to the oﬃces where meetings take place.8
6 For each municipality the distance is calculated as the distance between the largest
city in the municipality and the city where the oﬃce responsible for the job search program
is located. Distances are based on road distances using the quickest routes suggested by
Michelin Route Planner.
7 Distances to meetings are calculated in the same way as distances to job search pro-
grams.
8 We have no knowledge of the distances to the training programs scheduled after 44 Treatment effects – stylized facts 12
4 Treatment effects – stylized facts
We do the empirical analysis separately for the two counties because the or-
ganization of the re-employment activities oﬀered to the unemployed diﬀers
considerably between counties. Table 1 shows the meeting intensity, the job
search program participation rate and the training program participation
rate in the two regions.
In the treatment group the average weekly meeting intensity during the
ﬁrst 10 weeks of unemployment is about twice as large in Storstrøm as in
South Jutland. The meeting intensity is also somewhat higher in Storstrøm
than in South Jutland during weeks 11-20. The higher meeting intensity
in Storstrøm, of course, has to do with the design of the experiment. In
Storstrøm unemployed workers in the treatment group were supposed to
have meetings every week in the period between the job search program
and the training program whereas in South Jutland the intended meeting
frequency was once every second week.
The job search program participation rate is also considerably higher in
Storstrøm than in South Jutland in weeks 1-10, and whereas a signiﬁcant
fraction of the control group in Storstrøm participates in job search programs
almost none of the individuals in the control group in South Jutland partic-
ipates in this type of program. The treatment group has to participate in
training programs after approximately four months of unemployment. The
treatment groups’ participation rate in such programs is somewhat higher
in Storstrøm than in South Jutland during weeks 11-20 and 21-30. In sum,
during the ﬁrst 20 weeks of unemployment the additional mandatory ac-
tivities imposed on the treatment group (deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
the activity level of the treatment group and the control group) is most
comprehensive in Storstrøm.9
months of unemployment. The training programs may in principle take place anywhere
but the supply of training program slots is generally largest in the larger cities where there
are more educational institutions and work places to choose from.
9 A more detailed description of the county diﬀerences in the implementation of the
experiment and in the organization of the mandatory re-employment activities is given in
Graversen et al. (2007) and Rosholm (2008).4 Treatment effects – stylized facts 13
Table 1 also presents meeting intensities and program participation rates
separately for the three distance categories. There is a tendency, most pro-
nounced in Storstrøm, that meeting intensities and program participation
rates fall with distance to the nearest PES oﬃce. However, this tendency
exists for both the treatment group and the control group. Therefore, the
diﬀerence between the activity level of the treatment group and the control
group does not vary with distance.
Figure 2 illustrates the county speciﬁc survivor functions separately for
the treatment group and the control group. As shown the treatment group
leaves unemployment more quickly than the control group in both coun-
ties. The treatment eﬀect (measured as the diﬀerence between the survivor
functions of the control group and the treatment group) occurs earlier in
Storstrøm than in South Jutland, but otherwise the eﬀect evolves in almost
the same way over time. In both counties the treatment eﬀect peaks at 7–9
percentage points in the range 10–25 weeks after the ﬁrst day of unemploy-
ment.
To get a ﬁrst impression of the importance of the distance to the manda-
tory re-employment activities that individuals in the treatment group have
to attend, we calculated the diﬀerences between the survivor functions of the
control group and the treatment group splitting up the sample according to
distance. Figure 3 shows that indeed distance seems to matter. Generally,
the treatment eﬀect is largest for individuals living more than 25 kilometers
away from a PES oﬃce. Table 2 mimics the graphical results in Figure 3.
After 10, 15, 20, 25 and 30 weeks the eﬀect is largest for the distance cate-
gory 25+ km. The presence of a larger eﬀect for individuals living far away
from a PES oﬃce is particularly noticeable in Storstrøm. For example, while
the eﬀect after 15 weeks is 19 percentage points for the distance category
25+ km the eﬀect is only 5 percentage points for the distance categories 0-4
km and 5-24 km. Hence, while the overall treatment eﬀect of the intensive
mandatory activation program does not diﬀer much between counties, the
relationship between distance to re-employment activities and the treatment5 Empirical analysis 14
eﬀect of the activities seems to be somewhat diﬀerent in the two counties.10
5 Empirical analysis
5.1 Job ﬁnding rates
To investigate the interaction between treatment eﬀect and distance in more
detail we analyze job ﬁnding rates, which are deﬁned as transitions out of the
beneﬁt system. The individual job ﬁnding rate is assumed to have a mixed
proportional hazard (MPH) speciﬁcation. The job ﬁnding rate at unem-
ployment duration t conditional on observed characteristics x, unobserved
characteristics v and treatment status P is speciﬁed as
θ(t | x,P,v) = exp(x0β + ϕ(t) + ζ0P + ζ1P.d5−24 + ζ2P.d25+ + v) (6)
where x is a vector of personal characteristics, P is a dummy variable repre-
senting whether (P = 1) or not (P = 0) the individual was assigned to the
treatment group, the d’s are two dummy variables indicating whether the
distance between the municipality of the worker and the nearest activation
program is 5-24 kilometers or 25+ kilometers.11 Furthermore, β is a vector
of parameters representing the eﬀect of personal characteristics. The ζ’s are
the parameters of main interest. First, ζ0 indicates whether or not there
is a treatment eﬀect for individuals who live close by their PES. Second,
ζ1 and ζ2 indicate whether the treatment eﬀect is diﬀerent if the distance
to the nearest PES is larger. In the baseline model we assume that the ζs
are independent of the duration of unemployment and identical for diﬀerent
groups of workers.
The function ϕ(t) represents duration dependence in the transition rates
ϕ(t) = ΣkµkIk(t) (7)
10 The larger distance eﬀect in Storstrøm may have to do with the higher activity level
in ﬁrst months of the unemployment spell if individuals dislike the activities/travelling
and they form their expectations about future participation in mandatory activities on
the basis of the level of activities in the (near) past.
11 As discussed before for some individuals these dummy variables are time-varying.5 Empirical analysis 15
where the µ-parameters describe the stepwise duration dependence with k
(= 1,..,41) as a subscript for weekly duration intervals up to 30 weeks and
broader intervals from then onwards, and we normalize µ1 = 0.12
Finally, the unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to follow a discrete
distribution with two points of support va and vb, with Pr(v = va) = p
and Pr(v = vb) = 1 − p and p has a logit speciﬁcation. The two points of
support represent random eﬀects assumed to be orthogonal to the observed
characteristics of the individuals.
The parameters are estimated using the method of maximum likelihood.
The relevant parameter estimates are shown in Table 3; the upper part
shows the results for South Jutland, the lower part is for Storstrøm.13 Part
a reports the average treatment eﬀect per county. This average treatment
eﬀect is approximately the same for both counties; the average exit rate
from unemployment is about 26–27% higher for individuals in the treatment
group.
In part b of Table 3 we distinguish the treatment eﬀect by distance. In
South Jutland the treatment eﬀect increases with distance, but the treat-
ment eﬀects for the shorter distances are estimated imprecisely. The addi-
tional treatment eﬀect for individuals who live more than 25 km from their
activation program is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. For Storstrøm there
is a clear treatment eﬀect for individuals who live close to the treatment
program, while there is no additional treatment eﬀect for individuals who
live further away from their treatment program.
The distribution of personal characteristics in the treatment group and
the control group is very much the same, as was to be expected from a
random assignment of individuals to treatment and control group. However,
as shown in the appendix, there seems to be a correlation between age
and distance. Younger people live closer to the activation programs. This
may be a big city eﬀect – more older workers live in rural areas where
12 The broader intervals are 5 weekly intervals up to 80 weeks, and the interval 80+
weeks.
13 In the tables we only report the treatment eﬀects; the full estimation results are
available on request.5 Empirical analysis 16
they are more distant from treatment programs. Because of the correlation
between distance and age there is the danger of the distance eﬀects being
contaminated by age diﬀerences. Therefore, part c provides treatment eﬀects
by age group. As shown there are diﬀerences in treatment eﬀect by age
group. In particular for workers older than 40 in South-Jutland and workers
older than 50 in Storstrøm there is no interaction between distance and
treatment eﬀect. As discussed before workers older than 50 where treated
diﬀerently in Storstrøm, which reduced the variation in distance for this
group of workers. Therefore when studying the interaction between duration
of unemployment, distance and treatment eﬀect we removed the workers
over age 50 from the sample. Then, as shown in part d of Table 3 now
the two counties are more alike in terms of the interaction between distance
and treatment eﬀects. For workers below age 50 we only ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
treatment eﬀect if they live more than 25 km away from the place where the
activation takes place. As shown in part e there are also clear interactions
between unemployment duration and the treatment eﬀects. The treatment
eﬀects are largest when the distance to the treatment program is more than
25 kilometers and the duration of unemployment is more than 10 weeks.
Table 4 shows a sensitivity analysis for workers below age 50 when we
use 25 km as a threshold. For South Jutland there is no treatment eﬀect
for unemployed who live close to the activation program, but there is a sig-
niﬁcant treatment eﬀect for those that live further away than 25 km. Part
c of Table 4 shows that there is also an interaction between unemployment
duration and distance; the treatment eﬀect is strongest for unemployment
durations longer than 10 weeks for unemployed who live further away than
25 km. For Storstrøm for workers who live less than 25 km from the acti-
vation program there is a positive and signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect, but for
workers who live further away than 25 km there is an additional positive
and signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect. As shown in part c also for Storstrøm there
is an interaction between unemployment duration and distance. The largest
treatment eﬀect are for unemployed who with an unemployment spell of
more than 10 weeks who live far from the activation program.5 Empirical analysis 17
5.2 Post-unemployment jobs
An important issue in the debate on the eﬀectiveness of labor market pro-
grams is whether they aﬀect the quality of the post-unemployment jobs.
Figure 4 shows how long post-unemployment employment spells lasted.
Clearly, there are many workers who loose their post-unemployment job
rather quickly, but there doesn’t seem to be a diﬀerence between individuals
from the treatment group and individuals from the control group. Table 5
shows that the post-unemployment jobs of individuals in the control group
are very similar to those in the treatment group. Neither in terms of hourly
wages, ﬁnding a job in the municipality of residence, absence from work or
qualiﬁcations needed there is a clear relationship with the distance between
the municipality of residence and the activation program.
In order to investigate whether indeed there are no diﬀerences in post-
unemployment job quality we performed a more detailed statistical analysis.
We estimated log wage equations with the same explanatory variables as in
the job ﬁnding rates including a dummy indicator for being member of the
treatment group.14 As shown in the upper part of Table 6 there is a negative
but insigniﬁcant treatment eﬀect on wages in South Jutland, which doesn’t
vary with the distance. Whereas unemployed in South Jutland found a job
more quickly when they lived further away than 25 km from the activation
program, the quality of the job in terms of wages is not aﬀected by this
distance. The same holds for Storstrøm.
We also investigated whether the job separation rate depends on the
distance between worker and activation program. In the same way as we
speciﬁed a MPH model for the job ﬁnding rate we also speciﬁed a MPH
model for the job separation rate with unobserved heterogeneity following
a discrete distribution with two points of support. We allowed for correla-
14 There are also many workers for which the wage information is not available. We
investigated the relevance of potential selectivity in the observed wages by including a
Heckman selection term in the wage regressions. The probit model of presence of informa-
tion underlying the selection term included occupational dummies which were excluded
from the wage equation. However, we did not ﬁnd selectivity to be issue; therefore we
report parameter estimates without correcting for selectivity.6 Conclusions 18
tion between the unobserved heterogeneity in the job ﬁnding rate and the
job separation rate to account for potential selectivity in the job separation
rate. As shown in Table 6 the job separation rate of unemployed in the
treatment group is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the job separation rate
of unemployed workers in the control group. Also, the treatment eﬀect in
the job separation rate does not vary with the distance between unemployed
and activation program. All in all, there is indeed no relationship between
the distance and the quality of post-unemployment jobs. Even though un-
employed workers who live far from the place where the activation program
is administered ﬁnd a job more quickly this is not at the expense of the
quality of the job.15
6 Conclusions
In an experimental setting some Danish unemployed workers were assigned
to an activation program while others were not. Unemployed who were
assigned to the activation program found a job more quickly. We ﬁnd no
evidence of the quality of post-unemployment jobs being aﬀected by the acti-
vation. From a post-unemployment perspective activation is neither harmful
nor beneﬁcial for a worker. We also investigated why activation works. In
theory there are two eﬀects. The activation eﬀect related to the manda-
tory program participation reduces the value of being unemployed thereby
increasing the search intensity. The human capital eﬀect improves the la-
bor market position of the individual thereby increasing the eﬀectiveness of
search. Empirically we distinguish between the two explanations by ana-
lyzing diﬀerences in treatment eﬀects across individuals. In particular we
consider the eﬀect of physical distance between the unemployed worker and
the activation program. The human capital part of the program is uncor-
related with the travel distance but the compulsion part increases with the
distance. If individuals live further away from the place where activation
15 This ﬁnding is not unusual as for example both Black et al. (2003) and Klepinger
et al. (2002) ﬁnd no evidence of the post-unemployment earnings of workers exposed to
compulsory programs being aﬀected.6 Conclusions 19
occurs the perceived costs of participation in the program are likely to be
higher. We ﬁnd that the activation program increases the job ﬁnding rate.
And, indeed we ﬁnd that unemployed living further away from their acti-
vation program ﬁnd a job more quickly. Clearly the compulsion eﬀect must
be responsible for this. Activation programs mainly work because they are
compulsory and unemployed don’t like them.6 Conclusions 20
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A Appendix: Deﬁnitions and means of explanatory variables
The explanatory variables used in the analysis are deﬁned as follows:
• Male: dummy variable – reference group: female
• Dummies for age: 30-39, 40-49, 50+ years – reference group: Age <
30 years.
• Dummies for occupation: 1: Academics, engineers, economists; 2: Of-
ﬁcials, servants and salaried employees - white collar; 3: Construction;
4: Trade; 5: Self-employed; 6: Multidisciplinary; 7: Welfare workers;
8: Metal workers; 9: Food industries; 10: Other industries – reference
group: Unskilled and skilled workers - blue collar.
• Dummies immigrant status: Western, non-western – reference group:
native Danes.
• Previous unemployment status: Continuous variables indicating the
time period on public income support (0-1); Previous unemployed 1:
0-1 year before unemployment spell, Previous unemployed 2: 1-2 years
before unemployment spell, Previous unemployed 3: 2-3 years before
unemployment spell
• Excluded Member: dummy variable for members of treatment group,
that do not participate; many of these individuals became unemployed
because of bad weather and they will return to their job quickly once
the weather improves – reference group: members of treatment group
that participate.
• Dummies for experience: 5-10, 10-15, 15-20, 20+ years, reference
group: 0-5 years.
• Dummies for family status: Married, cohabiting, reference group: sin-
gle.
• Children: dummy variable for the presence of childrenB Tables and graphs 23
• Dummies for educational attainment: No educational information, up-
per secondary school, vocational education, short further education,
long further education, higher education.
Table 7 gives an overview of the means of the explanatory variables distin-
guished by county and distance category.
B Tables and graphsB Tables and graphs 24
Tab. 1: Weekly meeting intensities, job search program participa-
tion and training program participation by weeks of unem-
ployment (1-10, 11-20, 21-30) and distance in kilometers
(0-4, 5-24, 25+)
Treatment group Control group Diﬀerence
1-10 11-20 21-30 1-10 11-20 21-30 1-10 11-20 21-30
Meetings
a. South Jutland
0-4 km 0.16 0.30 0.28 0.15 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.22 0.18
5-24 km 0.16 0.30 0.29 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.21 0.20
25+ km 0.16 0.32 0.24 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.24 0.16
b. Storstrøm
0-4 km 0.32 0.38 0.20 0.16 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.26 0.09
5-24 km 0.31 0.38 0.21 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.17 0.27 0.09
25+ km 0.28 0.33 0.22 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.25 0.13
Job search program
a. South Jutland
0-4 km 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.02
5-24 km 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.01
25+ km 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.00
b. Storstrøm
0-4 km 0.16 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.12 0.01 -0.01
5-24 km 0.14 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.03 0.01
25+ km 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.01 0.01
Training program
a. South Jutland
0-4 km 0.01 0.11 0.29 0.02 0.07 0.11 -0.01 0.04 0.18
5-24 km 0.02 0.13 0.32 0.01 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.20
25+ km 0.02 0.11 0.28 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.01 0.06 0.17
b. Storstrøm
0-4 km 0.02 0.18 0.38 0.02 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.10 0.22
5-24 km 0.01 0.15 0.39 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.27
25+ km 0.02 0.12 0.29 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.01 0.07 0.20
Note: Meeting intensity = the number of meetings in a given week divided by the
number of individuals who are still unemployed in this week; program participation
rate = the number of individuals who participate in a program in a given week
divided by the number of individuals who are still unemployed in this week.B Tables and graphs 25
Tab. 2: Diﬀerences between survival functions treatment and con-
trol group; by weeks after assignment
Weeks 5 10 15 20 25 30
South Jutland
0-4 km 2.4 2.9 7.7 ** 8.8 ** 4.6 2.2
5-24 km 0.3 7.6 ** 6.6 * 4.8 7.3 ** 6.4**
25+ km 0.9 9.9 ** 10.7 ** 12.1 ** 9.3 ** 8.0**
Total 1.1 6.9** 8.3** 8.5** 7.1** 5.6**
Storstrøm
0-4 km 4.3 6.8 ** 5.1 7.3 ** 7.4 ** 7.1 **
5-24 km 0.4 4.9 4.6 4.8 * 5.7 ** 2.6
25+ km 7.7 ** 9.6 ** 18.7 ** 22.3 ** 15.9** 14.2 **
Total 3.3* 6.5** 7.4** 8.9** 8.2** 6.1**
Note: numbers with a ** (*) are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at a 5% (10%)
level.B Tables and graphs 26
Tab. 3: Parameter estimates hazard rate models
Treatment eﬀect Treatment Treatment -Logl. N
*(5-24 km) *(25+ km)
South Jutland – all age groups
a. One eﬀect 0.23 (0.06) ** – – 7510.9 2105
b. By distance 0.07 (0.11) 0.18 (0.15) 0.32 (0.15) ** 7508.4 2105
c. By age and distance
Age<30 -0.07 (0.17) 0.19 (0.23) 0.41 (0.23) * 7504.2 2105
Age 30-39 0.11 (0.18) 0.28 (0.23) 0.48 (0.23) **
Age 40-49 0.03 (0.17) 0.04 (0.22) 0.10 (0.22)
Age 50+ 0.31 (0.23) 0.12 (0.26) 0.18 (0.27)
South Jutland – age<50
d. By distance 0.01 (0.12) 0.16 (0.16) 0.35 (0.16)** 5680.0 1600
e. By duration and distance
1-10 weeks 0.12 (0.15) 0.03 (0.19) 0.22 (0.19) 5673.6 1600
11-20 weeks 0.16 (0.18) 0.02 (0.23) 0.42 (0.24) *
21+ weeks -0.49 (0.20) ** 0.73 (0.27) ** 0.79 (0.31) **
Storstrøm – all age groups
a. One eﬀect 0.24 (0.05) ** – – 8341.1 2368
b. By distance 0.25 (0.08) ** -0.12 (0.11) 0.19 (0.14) 8338.8 2368
c. By age and distance
Age<30 0.48 (0.15) ** -0.34 (0.19) * -0.17 (0.26) 8331.0 2368
Age 30-39 -0.01 (0.14) -0.07 (0.19) 0.70 (0.26) **
Age 40-49 0.09 (0.15) -0.14 (0.18) 0.41 (0.23) *
Age 50+ 0.41 (0.14) ** -0.13 (0.17) 0.09 (0.22)
Storstrøm – age<50
d. By distance 0.13 (0.10) 0.03 (0.14) 0.46 (0.18)** 5963.4 1702
e. By duration and distance
1-10 weeks 0.13 (0.11) -0.01 (0.16) 0.27 (0.21) 5958.0 1702
11-20 weeks 0.19 (0.15) 0.13 (0.20) 0.89 (0.25) **
21+ weeks 0.01 (0.19) 0.12 (0.26) 0.99 (0.38) **
Note: All estimates contain covariates for distance, gender, educational attainment,
experience, presence of children, dummy variables for the week of inﬂow, etcetera;
standard errors in parentheses; a ** (*) indicates signiﬁcance at a 95% (90%) level.B Tables and graphs 27
Tab. 4: Parameter estimates hazard rate models; workers below
age 50
Treatment eﬀect Treatment -Loglikelihood
*(25+ km)
South Jutland
a. One eﬀect 0.17 (0.07)** – 5682.4
b. By distance 0.09 (0.08) 0.26 (0.14) * 5680.5
c. By duration and distance
1-10 weeks 0.14 (0.10) 0.20 (0.16) 5677.9
11-20 weeks 0.16 (0.13) 0.40 (0.21) *
21+ weeks -0.15 (0.16) 0.42 (0.28) *
Storstrøm
a. One eﬀect 0.21 (0.07)** – 5966.7
b. By distance 0.14 (0.07)** 0.45 (0.17)** 5963.4
c. By duration and distance
1-11 weeks 0.12 (0.08) 0.27 (0.19) 5958.2
11-20 weeks 0.25 (0.12) ** 0.82 (0.23)**
21+ weeks 0.06 (0.15) 0.92 (0.36)**
Note: Based on 1600 (1702) workers for South Jutland (Storstrøm); all estimates
contain covariates for distance, gender, educational attainment, experience, pres-
ence of children, dummy variables for the week of inﬂow, etcetera; standard errors
in parentheses; a ** (*) indicates signiﬁcance at a 95% (90%) level.B Tables and graphs 28
Tab. 5: Characteristics post-unemployment jobs by group of work-
ers and distance to the nearest PES; workers below age 50
Treatment group Control group Diﬀerence
Distance (kilometers) 0-4 5-24 25+ 0-4 5-24 25+ 0-4 5-24 25+
South Jutland
Hourly wage (pre-unempl.) 130.4 127.7 128.4 123.2 132.1 127.7 7.2 -4.4 0.8
Hourly wage (post-unempl.) 132.4 130.0 126.3 130.0 128.5 129.5 2.4 1.4 -3.2
% working in municipality of residence 37.9 17.8 30.6 39.3 19.4 33.9 -1.5 -1.6 -3.3
Absence from work (% of total wage hours) 3.6 4.1 3.7 3.1 3.5 4.3 0.5 0.5 -0.6
Medium or high qualiﬁcations needed 18.5 15.2 14.3 21.3 10.6 15.6 -2.8 4.7 -1.3
Storstrøm
Hourly wage (pre-unempl.) 134.9 134.7 131.8 135.2 136.3 130.4 -0.4 -1.7 1.4
Hourly wage (post-unempl.) 139.6 137.2 133.6 141.7 140.4 131.3 -2.1 -3.2 2.2
% working in municipality of residence 33.7 15.8 31.9 30.8 18.2 42.9 2.9 -2.4 -10.9
Absence from work (% of total wage hours) 3.8 3.0 3.2 3.9 3.7 3.7 -0.1 -0.6 -0.4
Medium or high qualiﬁcations needed 25.3 9.7 10.4 23.0 17.7 13.7 2.3 -8.0 -3.3
Note: Wage rates in 2006 Danish KronerB Tables and graphs 29
Tab. 6: Parameter estimates quality of post-unemployment jobs;
workers below age 50




a. One eﬀect -0.02 (0.02) –
b. By distance -0.01 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) –
Employment duration
c. One eﬀect 0.06 (0.08) 9932.1
d. By distance 0.15 (0.10) -0.26 (0.17) 9930.5
Storstrøm
Wages
a. One eﬀect -0.01 (0.02) –
b. By distance -0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.04) –
Employment duration
c. One eﬀect -0.06 (0.08) 10350.4
d. By distance 0.09 (0.09) -0.16 (0.23) 10350.1
Note: Based on 1600 observations on employment durations (829 on wages) for
South Jutland and 1702 observations on employment durations (850 on wages) for
Storstrøm; all estimates contain covariates for distance, gender, educational attain-
ment, experience, presence of children, dummy variables for the week of inﬂow,
etcetera; standard errors in parentheses; a ** (*) indicates signiﬁcance at a 95%
(90%) level.B Tables and graphs 30
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Fig. 3: Diﬀerence between survivor functions of the treatment
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Tab. 7: Characteristics by region
South Jutland Storstrøm
0-4 km 5-24 km 25+ km 0-4 km 5-24 km 25+ km
Treatment 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.48 0.49 0.52
Male 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.59 0.63 0.61
Age 18-29 (ref) 0.34 0.24 0.21 0.27 0.17 0.21
Age 30-39 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24
Age 40-49 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.23
Age 50+ 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.33 0.32
Blue collar (ref) 0.30 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.42 0.43
Occupation 1 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02
Occupation 2 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.09 0.06 0.06
Occupation 3 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06
Occupation 4 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.07
Occupation 5 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.06
Occupation 6 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.10
Occupation 7 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07
Occupation 8 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Occupation 9 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04
Occupation 10 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04
Danes (ref) 0.90 0.94 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.96
Immigrants western 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
Immigrants non-western 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.03
Previous unemployed 1 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.22
Previous unemployed 2 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26
Previous unemployed 3 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27
Excluded member 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03
Experience 0-5 years (ref) 0.32 0.21 0.18 0.23 0.13 0.16
Experience 5-10 years 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.20
Experience 10-15 years 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.19
Experience 15-20 years 0.11 0.13 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.14
Experience 20+ years 0.19 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.39 0.31
Single (ref) 0.42 0.25 0.31 0.37 0.28 0.35
Married 0.36 0.52 0.50 0.40 0.50 0.40
Cohabiting 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.23 0.22 0.25
Children 0.33 0.41 0.42 0.36 0.41 0.36
Primary and lower sec (ref) 0.26 0.33 0.34 0.27 0.32 0.32
No educational information 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.04
Upper secondary school 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03
Vocational education 0.45 0.49 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.49
Short further education 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03
Long further education 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.07
Higher education 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
N 662 740 703 946 993 429